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Abstract While fully device-independent security in (BB84-like) prepare and
measure Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is impossible, it can be guaran-
teed against individual attacks in a semi device-independent (SDI) scenario,
wherein no assumptions are made on the characteristics of the hardware used
are made except for an upper bound on the the dimension of the communi-
cated system. Studying security under such minimal assumptions is especially
relevant in the context of the recent quantum hacking attacks wherein the
eavesdroppers can not only construct the devices used by the communicating
parties but are also able to remotely alter their behavior. In this work we study
the security of a SDIQKD protocol based on the prepare and measure quantum
implementation of a well-known cryptographic primitive, the Random Access
Code (RAC). We consider imperfect detectors and establish the critical values
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2 Anubhav Chaturvedi et al.
of the security parameters (the observed success probability of the RAC and
the detection efficiency) required for guaranteeing security against eavesdrop-
pers with and without quantum memory. Furthermore we suggest a minimal
characterization of the preparation device in order to lower the requirements
for establishing a secure key.
1 Introduction
In standard quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols the security proofs
assume that the parties have access to the correct and exact specifications
of the devices used therein. This assumption is rather problematic. First, the
principle problem lies at the heart of quantum formalism. Generally, these
devices are used for either state preparation or measurement. The quantum
formalism provides mathematical abstractions for states and measurements
but no direct way to infer about them individually. The only interface for
any inference about the states and measurements is via the Born rule which
combines states and measurements and yields the probability of outcomes,
which is compared to experimental results. So a full characterization of the
devices is sufficient to warrant security but it requires that each device and its
components are individually tested several times to gather enough statistics in
order to warrant trust. This is an extremely tedious task, instead we end up
trusting the manufacturer of the devices, which may be not the best idea. For
instance, the supplier can install back-doors, that enable him to compromise
the security without being detected. Recently a lot of attention has been drawn
to NSA which convinced RSA Security to set as a default in their products
Dual EC DRBG pseudo-random number generator which is in-turn known
to have such a back-door[1]. Moreover, even if the manufacturer is honest,
recent advances in quantum hacking [2] show that the adversary can remotely
influence the behavior of the devices during the protocol, effectively changing
their characteristics thereby hampering the security of the protocol. To cope
with this issue the device independent (DI) approach has been introduced
wherein the key idea is that if the parties violate a Bell (or some Bell-like)
inequality then, regardless of how their devices managed to do this, they can
establish secure communication. Although the term “DI” was first used in [3]
the idea can be tracked back all the way to the original Ekert’s paper [4].
Unfortunately, completely DI QKD is extremely arduous to realize in practice
and so far no experimental group has been able to do this. The main reason
for this is so-called detection efficiency loophole [5], which states that if the
probability of registering a particle by the detectors used in the experiment
is below a certain (usually very high) critical value then the results of the
experiment are inconclusive, in other words: the possibility of a local-realistic
description of its results cannot be ruled out. Ruling out the possibility these
descriptions is a necessary, although not always sufficient, condition for DI
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security 1. Another problem faced in this scenario is that it can be applied
only to protocols based on entanglement which are much more complicated
than their prepare-and-measure counterparts like the BB84 [6].
These two issues are addressed in the semi-device independent (SDI) ap-
proach [7]. Here a prepare-and-measure scenario is considered and again no
assumptions are made on the inner specifications and the working of the de-
vices used. Prefix “semi” is warranted by the fact that an upper bound on the
dimension of the communicated system is assumed. Assuming this bound is
well justified for both honest and dishonest manufacturer. In latter case the
parties can study the devices delivered and, while it is almost impossible to
fully characterize them, it is much easier to establish the effective dimension of
the Hilbert space in which the states are being prepared. When the supplier is
honest but the protocol is subject to a quantum hacking attack, the limitations
on the technology available to the eavesdropper make the task of increasing
the channel capacity extremely difficult. In fact, to our knowledge, all the
quantum hacking attacks published so far did not increase this capacity. Also,
because only one side employs the detectors, the requirements on their effi-
ciency are lower than in the DI case. Another relaxation of the DI paradigm is
measurement-device independent (MDI) scenario [8][9][13], wherein three de-
vices are used: two communicating parties, with perfectly characterized hard-
ware are sending the particles to the third which makes the measurements. No
assumptions are made on the characteristics of the third device. The difference
between MDI and SDI scenarios is that the former one is more complicated
(i.e. requires more devices and more sophisticated measurements) and does not
allow for any changes in the preparation devices (which is a big disadvantage
as even small changes can lead to the loss of security [10]). On the other hand,
it was shown [8] that MDI scenario thwarts quantum hacking attacks for any
efficiency of the detectors.
The aim of this paper is to establish the security condition in the SDI case
i.e. finding the critical values of the security parameters required in order to
establish a secure key. In the case of Bell inequalities, given an observed value
of detection efficiency (greater than the critical detection efficiency), if the
parties witness a Bell violation above a certain threshold, they are sure that
the system they share must be non-local (or entangled if quantum theory is
assumed). Similarly we find the threshold above which the SDIQKD protocol
is secure based on the threshold value of some observed parameter (for a given
certain value of observed detection efficiency). We start by defining the classes
of attacks against which we want to be secure. We consider individual attacks
in which eavesdropper may or may not have access to quantum memory. Then
we take the most basic SDIQKD protocol based on (2 → 1) QRAC [7] and
find the security conditions required against such attacks. Next we propose a
modification of this protocol (basing it on the (3→ 1) QRAC instead) which
1 Necessity stems from the fact that if the experiment could be described by classical
model it must be insecure as classical key distribution is impossible without additional
assumptions on computational power of the eavesdropper. Whether or not this condition is
sufficient depends on the details of the protocol and the power given to the eavesdropper.
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substantially reduces these security requirements. Furthermore, we suggest a
minimal characterization of the preparation device that substantially lowers
the requirements on the security parameters.
2 Device controlling attacks
In [2,15], the authors gave a simple description of the device controlling attacks
based on the detection efficiency loophole and experimentally demonstrated
the same. Assuming that Eve has perfect detectors while Bob’s detectors have
an average efficiency of 50%. Eve intercepts the signal sent from Alice to
Bob as a part of the BB84 protocol and measures it. Following which Eve
encodes her detection results into specially tailored bright pulse of light and
resends it to Bob. Because of the physical properties of the signal and the
physical implementation of Bob’s detectors, Bob obtains an outcome only
if he measures in the same basis as Eve. This implies that Bob’s detectors
work perfectly (with 100% efficiency) conditioned on the even that Eve’s and
Bob’s settings are the same and not work at all otherwise. On an average
Bob’s detectors work with 50% efficiency which does not raise any suspicions.
After the raw key exchange, Bob and Eve have identical bit values and basis
choices which after sifting, error correction and privacy amplification made via
classical communication allows Eve to get the identical final key as Alice and
Bob. In this way Eve, by active control of Bob’s detectors can secretly learn
the exchanged key. More about this type of control can be found in [14].
In [10] a different approach is presented. Here Eve apart from exploiting
her possibility of interfering during the calibration of Alice’s device introduces
a slight modification in it.
These examples highlight the need for more general security conditions
where Eve is assumed to be substantially powerful i.e. she can not only design
all the devices used in the protocol but can also actively control them. How-
ever there are natural limits to what she can do. Her modifications must not
be significant so as to avoid detection. Apart from this we assume that Eve
cannot make the preparation device use additional degree of freedom of the
communicated system to encode more information. Hence in the SDI scenario
we assume that the eavesdropper can mold the characteristics of the devices
used as well as actively control them during the protocol but cannot increase
the dimension of the system sent by Alice.
3 SDIQKD protocol
The DIQKD protocol bases its security on violation of a Bell inequality [11]
associated with the scenario. The key rate, in this case, is maximized by reach-
ing the quantum bound of this inequality. On the other hand, SDIQKD is a
prepare and measure key distribution protocol wherein the dimension of the
communicated system is upper bounded [7]. Specifically, this limitation is only
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for the dimension of the signal emitted by Alice’s device and doesn’t hold for
what Bob’s device is receiving. This minimal restriction is tremendously ad-
vantageous for Eve, which in-turn captures the fact that in device controlling
attacks, the pulse sent by Eve to Bob’s lab could carry substantially more in-
formation than just one bit. The SDIQKD scheme bases its security on beating
the classical bound on the winning probability (efficiency) of a related commu-
nication complexity task. In [7] the task used was a (2→ 1) Quantum Random
Access Code (QRAC)[12], a prepare and measure quantum implementation of
a well-known cryptographic primitive, the Random Access Code (RAC). In a
(2 → 1) QRAC Alice encodes her two input bits a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1} into a qubit
ρa0,a1 . Bob gets an input bit b ∈ {0, 1} and chooses his projective measure-
ments MBb based on it, where B ∈ {0, 1} is the outcome of his measurement.
Bob’s task is to return B = ab i.e. guessing the bth bit of Alice. The measure of
success in this task is the probability with which Bob is able to guess correctly,
we denote it by PB .
The SDIQKD protocol introduced in [7] comprises of many repetitions of
(2 → 1) QRAC. In each of them a0, a1 and b were chosen randomly by Alice
and Bob, respectively. After this Bob announces his choice of b for each round.
The bit ab forms the bit of key for that round. Alice knows it, since it is one
of the bits she herself randomly generated. Bob has some information about
ab. Probability for Bob to obtain (for fixed settings a0, a1 and b) the result i
is P (B = i|a0, a1, b) = tr(MB=ib ρa0,a1). Here, MB=ib are projective operators
such that
∑
i∈{0,1}M
B=i
b = I. The primary security parameter is the average
success probability for (2→ 1) QRAC,
PB =
1
8
∑
a0,a1,b∈{0,1}
P (B = ab|a0, a1, b). (1)
Parties randomly choose some of the rounds and announce a0 and a1 for those
rounds in order to estimate PB . Later the parties perform standard error
correction and privacy amplification to obtain perfectly correlated, secure bit
strings (see Fig. 1).
Pb is the only security parameter if we consider the ideal case with perfect
detectors i.e. all systems leaving Alice’s lab at detected at Bob’s end. In the
case with losses, the average detection efficiency (ηavg) of Bob’s detectors forms
the other security parameter. It is important to specify how the communicat-
ing parties deal with the rounds in which no particle is detected. Although
there are other options, here we choose the simplest one: these rounds are
discarded from the statistics. This choice enables the parties to have the es-
timated average success probability close to the optimal one ( 2+
√
2
4 in the
perfect case for (2→ 1) QRAC).
4 Assumptions and attacks
We make the following assumptions:
6 Anubhav Chaturvedi et al.
a0 a1 b
B = abab
ρa0,a1 ∈ P(Cd)
Alice Bob
b
{M bB}
Fig. 1 A single round of the SDIQKD protocol based on (2 → 1) QRAC. Here the larger
boxes represent Alice’s and Bob’s labs of which their preparation and measurement devices
respectively (represented by smaller boxes) are a part of. The thinner lines represent classical
communication channels and thick lines represent quantum communication channels which
in this case has a bounded capacity. The SDIQKD protocol contains the (2 → 1) QRAC
along with a classical communication channel carrying Bob’s input b and the classical post-
processing at Alice’s end (represented by a small disk) required to output ab using a0, a1, b
as inputs.
1. Eve cannot influence the dimension of the system leaving Alice’s lab,
2. Eve performs individual attacks,
3. For each bit of the key, Eve’s information about it is stored in a bit repre-
senting her best guess of this bit,
4. Alice’s and Bob’s devices are controlled by Eve. She can make detectors
work with 100% efficiency if she chooses to. She also can send information
to them by hidden side channels. This implies that the states leaving Alice’s
lab can depend on Eve’s choice of measurement. While the measurement
basis of Bob’s device can depend on both Eve’s choice of measurement as
well as her outcome,
5. There is no information leakage from the devices. This implies that Eve
cannot receive any useful information using hidden side channels.
6. Bob’s observed detection efficiency is the same for each of his measure-
ments.
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In this part of the paper we study the security of SDIQKD against two
distinct classes of attacks,
1. Intercept/Resend (without quantum memory),
2. Delayed Measurement (with a qubit of quantum memory).
4.1 Intercept/Resend (IR)
Eve intercepts the signal transmitted from Alice to Bob and measures it in a
bases chosen based on her input e ∈ {0, 1} (see Fig. 2) [20,21]. Eve’s input
e represents her guess of input of Bob’s input b for that particular round. It
is crucial for the security of the protocol that e and b are uncorrelated, in
other words that there’s no information leaking from Bob’s lab. However, Eve
being able to choose different detection probabilities for rounds when e = b
and e 6= b artificially introduces correlations between e and b at the level of
post-selected rounds of the experiment.
Eve uses the measurement MEe and obtains an output bit E ∈ {0, 1}. At
this stage we can write Eve’s outcome probabilities as,
P (E = i|a0, a1, e, b) = P (E = i|a0, a1, e)
= Tr(ME=ie ρa0,a1,e),
(2)
where the first equality is because of the fact that Eve gets her outcome E be-
fore Bob inputs b. Here,ME=ie are projection operators such that
∑
i∈{0,1}M
E=i
e =
I. In turns out that it is optimal for Eve to send the state ρa0,a1,e,E=i = ME=ie
to Bob, with probability P (E = i|a0, a1, e) as it represents her best knowledge
about Alice’s input. In fact, it is the most general strategy. Since we assume
that the eavesdropper has full control over Bob’s measurements, any unitary
transformation of the state can be replaced by a corresponding transformation
of the measurement bases.
According to assumption 4 Eve, for an observed value of the average de-
tection efficiency of Bob’s detectors ηavg can design in advance all the states
ρa0,a1,e and all measurements M
B
e,E,b and M
E
e . However, in any given round of
communication she is not aware of values of a1, a2 and b having just e chosen
by her.
At Bob’s end, MB=ie,E,b are projective operators satisfying
∑
i∈{0,1}M
B=i
e,E,b =
I. Bob’s outcome probabilities are given by,
P (B = i|a0, a1, e, b, E) = Tr(MB=ie,E,bρa0,a1,e,E). (3)
As Bob does not know Eve’s output, we can obtain the outcome probabilities
apparent to Bob, by summing over the values of E which yields,
P (B = i|a0, a1, e, b) =
=
∑
j∈{0,1}
P (E = j|a0, a1, e)P (B = i|E = j, a0, a1, e, b)
=
∑
j∈{0,1}
Tr(ME=je ρa0,a1,e)Tr(M
B=i
e,j,bM
E=j
e ). (4)
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a0 a1 e
E = abab
ρa0,a1,e ∈ P(Cd)
Alice Eve
b
B = ab
Bob
ρa0,a1,e,E{M eE} {M e,bB }
bb
Fig. 2 A snapshot of a successful implementation of the Intercept/Resend (IR) attack
on SDIQKD protocol. Here again the thin lines represent classical communication channels
while the thick lines represent the quantum communication channel. The dotted lines rep-
resent channel for Eve’s active control of Alice’s and Bob’s devices or equivalently channel
for distribution of shared randomness. Notice that only the quantum channel leaving Al-
ice’s lab has an upper bound on capacity. Finally, as Eve does not have access to quantum
memory she has to output her guess of ab as soon as she intercepts Alice’s communicated
state. Therefore classical communication carrying Bob’s input b is of no use to her except
in classical post-processing.
Both Eve and Bob are interested in guessing ab, therefore we can write these
probabilities using a simplified notation as,
P eEb =
1
4
∑
a0,a1∈{0,1}
P (E = ab|e, a0, a1), (5)
P eBb =
1
4
∑
a0,a1∈{0,1}
P (B = ab|e, b, a0, a1). (6)
Next we split Bob’s detection efficiency ηavg = P (Click) into
η = P (Click|e 6= b),
ηe=b = P (Click|e = b). (7)
Here Click signifies occurrence of the event namely Bob’s detectors provide an
outcome. The other no-click event could occur because of certain malfunction
in the set-up (the devices or the channel) or an deliberate attempt at hacking
the protocol by a malicious third party. Note that different values of η and
ηe=b, together with assumption 5, imply that the distribution of e must be
uniform.
At this point Eve maximizes ηe=b making it unity as she wants Bob’s
device to return the outcomes as often as possible when she managed to guess
Bob’s input correctly. At the same time she also tries to minimize η. Only
thing limiting her in doing so is the observed detection efficiency which can be
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easily verified by Bob. Since Eve has no control over Bob’s settings, P (b) =
P (b = e) = 12 . This leads to
ηavg =
1 + η
2
. (8)
Here the observed success probabilities for Bob and Eve, post-selected
to rounds when Bob’s detector registered a particle can be represented as
weighted averages over inputs e and b,
PE(η) =
1
2(1 + η)
(
P 0E0 + ηP
0
E1 + ηP
1
E0 + P
1
E1
)
, (9)
PB(η) =
1
2(1 + η)
(
P 0B0 + ηP
0
B1 + ηP
1
B0 + P
1
B1
)
. (10)
Alice and Bob can establish a secret key if Shannon’s mutual informa-
tion between Alice and Bob is greater than between Alice and Eve (I(A :
B) > I(A : E)). Assumption 3 makes E a binary observable as it con-
tains her best guess of the bth bit of Alice (ab). Then I(A : E) becomes
H(ab) −H(ab|E) = 1 − h(PE), where h(.) is binary Shanon entropy and PE
the probability that E = ab. Similarly I(A : B) = 1 − h(PB). The condi-
tion I(A : B) > I(A : E) implies h(PB) < h(PE). The parties always abort
the protocol if the average success probability PB is lower than the classical
maximum winning probability of a (2 → 1) QRAC ( 34 ) as no security can
be guaranteed in this case even for perfect detectors [7]. Assuming PB >
3
4 ,
PE >
3
4 , in this region the Shannon’s entropy function, h(.) is monotonically
decreasing, which enables us to simplify h(PB) < H(PE) to
PB(η) > PE(η). (11)
Therefore whenever PB(η) is higher than maximal success probability achiev-
able by Eve, PmaxE (η) protocol is secure. Alice and Bob can rest assured that
the protocol is secure if the value of PB(η) is greater than the critical value
P CB(η) =
1
2 max{PB(η) + PE(η)}. Now as both PE(η) and PB(η) are simulta-
neously maximized, this boils down to finding,
P CB(η) = P
max
E (η) = max
{
P 0E0 + ηP
0
E1
+ ηP 1E0 + P
1
E1
2(1 + η)
}
. (12)
with P eEb =
1
4
∑
a0,a1
Tr(ρa0,a1,eM
E=ab
e ) and the maximization is over all pos-
sible measurements of Eve and Bob as well as preparations of Alice. Here we
consider two cases:
– The general case: Assumption 4. implies that Eve could have access to
shared randomness which allows her to control both the devices during
the protocol. We assume that the shared randomness used by Eve in both
Alice’s and Bob’s device is the same as her input e. In Alice’s device this
implies that there are eight possible preparations ρa0,a1,e which depend
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on Alice’s input a0, a1 as well as Eve’s shared random bit e. The security
condition here is,
P CB(η) =
1
2
(1 +
1
1 + η
). (13)
The details of the physical implementation of the attack and the derivation
of the condition can be found in APPENDIX (i),
– A minimal characterization of preparation device: Because of the fact that
manipulations in Alice’s lab are much more difficult for Eve than just taking
control over Bob’s lab by hijacking the signal, we start with an assumption
that while Eve can choose Alice’s preparations, she cannot modify them
during the protocol. This assumption is justifiable as the only reasonable
strategy to actively control Alice’s device is to use shared randomness (or
some classical signal which can be modeled using shared randomness) and
Alice can use some of her seed to exhaust correlation between her device
and Eve’s input (or in case of control via classical signal, Alice could easily
bar all input signal as her device’s only job is to send information). This
let’s us denote Alice’s preparations as ρa0,a1 as now the state leaving Alice’s
device is only dependent on her inputs a0, a1 and not on Eve’s input e
or shared randomness. Now as Eve wants to maximize her probability of
guessing bth bit of Alice, it is optimal for her to choose the preparations
to be Mutually Unbiased Bases (MUBs). This yields the following security
condition,
P CB(η) =
1
4
(
2 + cosαη +
1− η
1 + η
sinαη
)
. (14)
The details of implementation of the attack and the derivation of the se-
curity condition can be found in APPENDIX (ii).
4.2 Delayed Measurement (DM)
Let us now consider a more general approach with a more powerful Eve who
is equipped with a qubit of memory ρo (per signal) [22,23]. Yet again we deal
with two sub-cases
– The general case: Eve after receiving the signal ρa0,a1,e from Alice, without
any knowledge about Bob’s input b ∈ {0, 1} performs unitary transforma-
tion Ue (based on her input bit e) on both qubits and produces,
ρ˜a0,a1,e = Ueρa0,a1,e ⊗ ρoU†e , (15)
where ρ˜a0,a1,e is a two qubit state. Eve then forwards the first subsystem
to Bob, while holding on to the second one. In this way Eve delays her
measurement until Bob publicly announces his setting b (see Fig.3). Bob’s
projective measurement MBb,e and Eve’s measurement M
E
e,b are designed by
Eve so as to maximize her success probabilities while keeping Bob’s success
probabilities to a observed value greater than the threshold classical value.
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Note that, since Eve now measures after Bob does, Bob’s measurement
cannot depend on E. The joint probabilities can be written as,
P (E = i, B = j|a0, a1, e, b) =
Tr((ME=ie,b ⊗MB=je,b )ρ˜a0,a1,e).
(16)
Summing over Bob’s outcome yields the probability of Eve outcomes,
P (E = i|a0, a1, e, b) =
Tr((ME=ie,b ⊗ I)ρ˜a0,a1,e).
(17)
In this case we get same final security condition as (13) details of which
are provided in APPENDIX (iii).
– A minimal characterization of preparation device: The restriction that
while Eve can choose the states that leave Alice’s lab she cannot alter
them during the protocol is still helpful. We find that the optimal states
are still the MUBs (29) and the security condition we obtain here is the
same as (14).
a0 a1 e
E = abab
ρa0,a1,e ∈ P(Cd)
Alice Eve
b
B = ab
Bob
ρa0,a1,e
Ue {M e,bB }
{M e,bE } bb
Fig. 3 Successful implementation of Delayed Measurement (DM) attack on SDIQKD pro-
tocol. Eve’s lab now has two devices. The first device intercepts the signal sent from Alice’s
lab and applies a unitary based on Eve’s input bit e on the joint system of the signal and
quantum memory. This device then forwards the signal to Bob and quantum memory to
Eve’s second device. The second device performs a measurement on the quantum memory
based on Eve’s input e, Bob’s input b retrieved from classical communication carrying it
and yields an output.
These results were verified using techniques such as the seesaw method based
Semi Definite Programming (SDP) [17,18,19] deploying generalized measure-
ments (POVMs) and plotted in Fig. 4. We conclude that neither quantum
memory or generalized measurements help the eavesdropper.
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0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
P B
(
)
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4 Critical value of the success probability PCB(η) for SDIQKD based on (2→ 1) QRAC
vs. observed average detection efficiency ηavg . Because we assume that the communicating
parties use post-selection and remove all the rounds when Bob did not register a particle
from statistics, inefficient detectors do not lower Bob’s success probability which can be
close to the quantum maximum of 2+
√
2
4
(the thin dotted horizontal line) regardless of the
value of ηavg . The graphs represent the minimal value of observed success probability PB
required in order to guarantee security against (a) Eve with an unrestricted active control of
both Alice’s preparation device and Bob’s measurement and equipped with (DM) or without
(IR) quantum memory and , (b) Eve with no active control of Alice’s preparation device
and equipped with (DM) or without (IR) quantum memory.. The plot allows one to infer
about level of security provided by the devices. This can be done by comparing the observed
operational parameters PB , ηavg with P
C
B (η). If for an observed ηavg , PB > P
C
B (η) then the
protocol is secure.
5 Modified SDI protocol
Here we present SDI protocol based on (3 → 1) QRAC which is a straight-
forward generalization of the (2 → 1) QRAC and study its security against
both (IR and DM) attacks. In a (3 → 1) QRAC Alice is given three bits
a0, a1, a2 ∈ {0, 1} depending on which she sends the state ρa0,a1,a2 , while Bob
gets a classical trit, b ∈ {0, 1, 2} and is required to guess the value of ab.
Bob’s final output is B ∈ {0, 1} and the success probability is labeled by
PB = P (B = ab). The quantum maximum success probability is
3+
√
3
6 where
as the classical maximum remains the same 34 . Yet again, the bit ab forms the
raw key bit and after classical post-processing yields the final key. Eve wants
to learn ab in order to establish the same key with Alice as Bob. We keep the
structure, the reasoning and the notation (IR and DM) the same as in the SDI
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a0 a2 b ∈ {0, 1, 2}
B = abab
ρa0,a1,a2 ∈ P(Cd)
Alice Bob
a1
{M bB}
b
Fig. 5 A single round of SDIQKD protocol based (3 → 1) QRAC. Alice has three inputs
a0, a1, a2 instead of two in the (2→ 1) QRAC.
protocol based on (2→ 1) QRAC. In this case the average detection efficiency
of Bob’s detector is given by,
ηavg =
1 + 2η
3
. (18)
Owing to the fact that P (b = e) = P (b) = 13 . Eve’s success probability is given
by,
PE(η) =
1
3(1 + 2η)
(
P 0E0 + η(P
0
E1 + P
0
E2) +
P 1E1 + η(P
1
E0 + P
1
E2) + P
2
E2 + η(P
2
E1 + P
2
E0)
)
. (19)
Again we branch into two cases:
– The general case: Assumption 4. implies that Eve could have access to
shared randomness which allows her to control both the devices during
the protocol. We assume that the shared randomness used by Eve in both
Alice’s and Bob’s device is the same as her input e. In Alice’s device this
implies that there are eight possible preparations ρa0,a1,a2,e which depend
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on Alice’s input a0, a1, a2 as well as Eve’s shared random bit e. Under both
IR and DM attacks we have the following security condition,
P CB(η) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
1 + 2η
)
. (20)
In a nutshell, the deviation from (13) could be attributed to the spread
of e, b ∈ {0, 1, 2}. As both e, b are considered to be uniformly random, the
chances of them being equal are lowered down to P (e = b) 13 . The details
of the implementation and a brief proof sketch is provided in APPENDIX
(iv).
– A minimal characterization of preparation device As manipulations in Al-
ice’s lab are much more difficult for Eve than just taking control over Bob’s
lab by hijacking the signal, we start with an assumption that while Eve
can choose Alice’s preparations, she cannot modify them during the proto-
col. This let’s us denote Alice’s preparations as ρa0,a1,a2 as now the state
leaving Alice’s device is only dependent on her inputs a0, a1, a2 and not
on Eve’s input e or shared randomness. This yields the following security
condition for both IR and DM attacks is as follows,
P CB(η) =
{
φ(η), for η ∈ [0, 3
√
2−4
2 ]
3
4 , η ∈ ( 3
√
2−4
2 , 1]
(21)
where
φ(η) =
1
8
(
4 + (1 + cosαη) cosβη +
+
2(1− η)
1 + 2η
sinαη sinβη
)
,
αη = arccos
(
1
N(η)2 − 1
)
,
βη = arctan
(
tan(αη)
N(η)
)
,
N(η) =
2(1− η)
1 + 2η
. (22)
Unlike the previous case, if Eve wants to maximize her probability of guess-
ing bth bit of Alice, it is optimal for her to choose the preparations that
are not MUBs but converge to MUBs under a specific efficiency condition.
The details are provided in APPENDIX (v).
These results were verified using techniques such as the seesaw method based
Semi Definite Programming (SDP) deploying generalized measurements (POVMs)
and plotted in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6 Critical value of the success probability PCB(η) for SDIQKD based on (3 → 1)
QRAC vs. ηavg . The thin dotted horizontal line represents the quantum maximum winning
probability 3+
√
3
6
. The graphs represent the minimal value of observed success probability PB
required in order to guarantee security against (a) Eve with an unrestricted active control of
both Alice’s preparation device and Bob’s measurement and equipped with (DM) or without
(IR) quantum memory and , (b) Eve with no active control of Alice’s preparation device
and equipped with (DM) or without (IR) quantum memory. The plot allows one to infer
about level of security provided by the devices. This can be done by comparing the observed
operational parameters PB , ηavg with P
C
B (η). If for an observed ηavg , PB > P
C
B (η) then the
protocol is secure. Notice the increased tolerance (possibility of a secure protocol) at lower
values of detection efficiency (ηavg) as compared to the security offered by the protocol
based on (2→ 1) QRAC Fig. 4.
6 Conclusions.
In this paper we analyzed individual quantum hacking attacks on SDIQKD pro-
tocols based on QRACs where eavesdropper can not only design but actively
control all devices during the protocol. Looking at these types of attacks was
motivated by their recent experimental realizations. We study security against
two types of quantum eavesdroppers (with and without access to quantum
memory) and for two distinct levels of characterizations of the devices (with
and without a minimal characterization of the preparation device). We found
that access to small quantum memory (a qubit) does not help the eavesdrop-
per to attack the SDIQKD protocol and conjecture that the same holds for
other protocols and unlimited memory. As QKD in general is gaining immense
popularity [25,26,27,28] and entanglement based QKD remains commercially
nonviable, devices employing prepare and measure QKD schemes seems to be
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ηcriticalavg (a) (b)
(2→ 1) QRAC 0.71 1
2
(3→ 1) QRAC 0.58 1
3
Table 1 Critical average detection efficiency ηcriticalavg for (a) Eve without quantum memory
(IR) or equipped with quantum memory (DM) and unrestricted active control of both Alice’s
preparation device and Bob’s measurement device, (b) Eve without quantum memory (IR)
or equipped with quantum memory (DM) and no active control of Alice’s preparation device.
natural way forward. Our analysis other than being robust, deals with worst
case scenarios and provides for the everyday naive user a hassle-free way to
infer about the security his devices offer. In particular Fig. 4. and Fig. 6. pro-
vide a straightforward way to ensure security, namely, a user can crosscheck
the operational security parameters PB , ηavg against P
C
B (η), and if he finds
the PB > P
C
B (η), he can rest-assured without going into further details. Our
double-layered results enable such crosschecking for two layers of device speci-
fication and may be used according to varying degrees of trust in the provider.
We provide condition for establishing a secure key for SDIQKD based on
(2→ 1) QRAC and (3→ 1) QRAC against Eve who has full active control of
their devices. Using SDIQKD based on (3→ 1) QRAC lowers the key-rate but
the security requirements are significantly lowered. Further, a minimal char-
acterization for the preparation device is provided which lowers the critical
detection efficiency all the way down to 50% for (2→ 1) QRAC and to 41.2%
for (3 → 1) QRAC. We have listed the critical detection efficiencies for the
various cases considered in Table 1. It is known that (2→ 1) RAC and (3→ 1)
RAC can also be implemented using entanglement and classical communica-
tion, often called the (2 → 1) Entanglement Assisted RAC (EARAC). These
implementations can also be seamlessly used for QKD using the aforemen-
tioned method. We conjecture based on numerical evidence that the results
derived in this work still hold for (2→ 1) and (3→ 1) EARAC.
We would like to remark that the critical detection efficiency is the effi-
ciency of the whole process taking into the account not only the losses in the
device of the receiver but also in the transmission. Therefore, in practice, they
will increase with the distance between the parties and the critical detection
efficiency of a protocol puts a bound on how far apart the communicating
parties can be. For the standard device independent QKD this distance is
just a couple of kilometers [16]. Using SDI protocols described here it can be
significantly extended. Our results suggest a connection between security and
MUB based encoding decoding schemes, which deserves further exploration.
While this work studied security of SDIQKD protocols with constrained ca-
pacity (dimension) of the communication channel, security based on other SDI
constraints have also shown potential, for instance the oblivious constraint as
introduced in [24].
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Appendix
(i)
W.l.o.g. we can consider Eve’s projective measurements to be,
|ME=0e 〉 = cos
αe
2
|0〉+ sin αe
2
|1〉
|ME=1e 〉 = |ME=0e 〉⊥, (23)
and ME=0e = |ME=0e 〉〈ME=0e |,ME=0e = |ME=1e 〉〈ME=1e |. Now one can rewrite (12) as,
PmaxE (η) =
1
2
max
{
Pa0=a1E + P
a0 6=a1
E (η)
}
, (24)
where
Pa0=a1E =
1
4
Tr
(
ρ000M
0
0 + ρ001M
0
1+
ρ110M
1
0 + ρ111M
1
1
)
,
(25)
Pa0 6=a1E (η) =
1
4
Tr
(
ρ010
M00 + ηM
1
0
1 + η
+
ρ011
M11 + ηM
0
1
1 + η
+ ρ100
M10 + ηM
0
0
1 + η
+
ρ101
M11 + ηM
0
1
1 + η
).
(26)
Notice that (25) and (26) divide Alice’s preparations into two mutually exclusive subsets.
Alice’s states that maximize Pa0=a1E , ρ0,0,0, ρ0,0,1, ρ1,1,0, ρ1,1,1 remain the same irrespective
of whether Eve was able to correctly guess Bob’s input (e = b) or not (e 6= b) simply because
both of Alice’s input are the same. This allows Eve to set these states equivalent to the
projectors M00 ,M
0
1 ,M
1
0 ,M
1
1 , respectively. Which in-turn allows one to re-write (24) as,
PmaxE (η) =
1
2
(1 + max{Pa0 6=a1E (η)). (27)
Now in-order to find the maximum value of (26) consider one of the terms involved,
Tr
(
ρ010
M00 + ηM
1
0
1 + η
)
=
1
1 + η
− 1− η
1 + η
Tr
(
ρ010M
1
0
)
, (28)
where the equality stems from the fact that M00 = I −M10 . The maximum for this term is
reached by setting ρ010 = M00 which yields the final security condition (13).
(ii)
W.l.o.g she fixes Alice’s preparations to be MUBs,
ρ00 = |0〉〈0|,
ρ01 =
1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)(〈0|+ 〈1|),
ρ10 =
1
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)(〈0| − 〈1|),
ρ11 = |1〉〈1|, (29)
20 Anubhav Chaturvedi et al.
which is an optimal set of states for the standard (2 → 1) QRAC. Next w.l.o.g. we char-
acterize Eve’s projective measurement using vectors from the same plane as the states in
(29),
|ME=0e 〉 = cos
αe
2
|0〉+ sin αe
2
|1〉,
|ME=1e 〉 = |ME=0e 〉⊥, (30)
and MEe = |MEe 〉〈MEe |. This allows us to partition (12) into two parts based on different
values of e. These parts are independent and, due to symmetry, equal. Therefore we may
re-write PE(η) as ,
PE(η) = max
{
P 0E0 + ηP
0
E1
1 + η
}
, (31)
which is,
PE(η) =
1
8(1 + η)
Tr
(
ME=0e=0 (ρ00 + ρ01)+
ME=1e=0 (ρ10 + ρ11)
)
+
η
8(1 + η)
Tr
(
ME=0e=0 (ρ00 + ρ10)+
ME=1e=0 (ρ01 + ρ11)
)
.
(32)
After plugging in (29),(30), this yields,
PmaxE (η) = maxα0
(PE(η))
=
1
4
(
2 + cosα0 +
1− η
1 + η
sinα0
)
.
(33)
This expression is maximized for αη = arctan
(
1−η
1+η
)
. Hence, we obtain the security condi-
tion (14).
(iii)
Here the success probability for Eve is,
PE(η) =
1
8(1 + η)
Tr
∑
a0a1eb
η1−δebP (E = ab|a0, a1, e, b), (34)
which can in-turn be expressed as,
PE(η) =
1
8
Tr
[∑
i,j
ρ˜i,i,j
ME=ji,i ⊗ I + ηME=ji,1−i ⊗ I
1 + η
+
ρ˜i,1−i,j
M
E=1−δi,j
i,i ⊗ I + ηM
E=δi,j
i,1−i ⊗ I
1 + η
]
.
(35)
Notice that this expression constitutes four independent elements for specific value of the
pair (i, j). In order to find PE(η)
max we need only find the maximizing condition for one
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term. Let’s consider a particular pair (i, j), then the expression for PE(η)
max simplifies to,
PmaxE (η) =
1
2
max
{
Tr
(
ρ˜i,i,j
ME=ji,i ⊗ I + ηME=ji,1−i ⊗ I
1 + η
+
ρ˜i,1−i,j
M
E=1−δi,j
i,i ⊗ I + ηM
E=δi,j
i,1−i ⊗ I
1 + η
)}
.
(36)
This equation is maximized when ME=ji,i = M
E=j
i,1−i or M
E=1−δi,j
i,i = M
E=δi,j
i,1−i yielding the
same security condition as (13).
(iv)
In the case when Eve does not have access to quantum memory (IR) we can re-write (19)
in a convenient way as,
PmaxE (η) =
1
4
max
{
Pa0=a1=a2E + P
NOT{a0=a1=a2}
E
}
, (37)
where Pa0=a1=a2E is Eve’s success probability for the case when all three of the input bits
of Alice are equal and P
NOT{a0=a1=a2}
E is Eve’s success probability for the case when the
three inputs of Alice are not equal. As Alice’s states and Bob’s measurement that maximize
Pa0=a1=a2E remain the same irrespective of the fact whether Eve was able to guess Bob’s
input correctly or not we can further re-write this as,
PmaxE (η) =
1
4
(
1 + max
{
P
NOT{a0=a1=a2}
E
})
. (38)
Following exactly the same steps as above this yields the security condition (20).
(v)
We find that the optimal states are,
|000〉 = |0〉,
|001〉 = cos α
2
|0〉+ sin α
2
|1〉,
|010〉 = cos α
2
|0〉+ eiβ sin α
2
|1〉,
|100〉 = cos α
2
|0〉+ e−iβ sin α
2
|1〉,
|111〉 = |000〉⊥,
|110〉 = |001〉⊥,
|101〉 = |010〉⊥,
|011〉 = |100〉⊥, (39)
where α and β are parameters controlled by Eve. In this case optimal encoding for standard
(3 → 1) QRAC is reproduced for α = arccos 1
3
and β = 2pi/3. For Eve’s measurements
(M
E=ab
e = |ME=abe 〉〈ME=abe |) we use the following parametrization
|ME=0e 〉 = cos
αe
2
|0〉+ eiβe sin αe
2
|1〉
|ME=1e 〉 = |ME=0e 〉⊥, (40)
A straightforward maximization yields the security condition (21).
